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Not every conflict or crisis escalates to war. Even when there may seem to be no way out, a way is sometimes found. For example, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy estimated the chances of nuclear war as "somewhere between one out of three and even" (Sorenson, 1965, p. 705 ). Yet Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev and Kennedy worked their way out of a nuclear box, each making concessions while resisting the siren calls from some advisors to "stand firm" or even begin military action (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997) .
In March of that same year, French President Charles de Gaulle, who had been brought to power in 1958 by a virtual military coup in support of a continued colonialist "Algerie franchise," success fully negotiated Algerian independence. And 6 months later, on a visit to France's ancient enemy Germany, de Gaulle several times spoke, in German, of "the great German people," repeatedly ex claiming, with his arms raised above his head, "Es lebe Deut schland!" ["Long live Germany!"] (de Gaulle, 1970, pp. 6-9, 15; see also La Couture, 1991, p. 341) .
Finally, consider the annus mirabilis that began in February 1989. On the 6th of that month, the government of Poland re frained from introducing martial law to suppress dissent (as it had in December 1981) and instead began roundtable talks that led to open elections. In October, the East German regime responded to massive demonstrations in East Berlin and Dresden, not with force and repression (as in 1953) , but with discussions that began the This article is based on Langner (1997) . We are grateful to Jill Greenlee and John Herrington for assistance in scoring concessions and to Eileen Zurbriggen and Cheryl Rusting for assistance in scoring motive imagery.
process of peaceful unification of East and West Germany. In November, the "velvet revolution" in Czechslovakia led to the end of one-party rule and the promise of elections. And in February 1990, South African nationalist party leader Frederik de Klerk announced the "unbanning" of the African National Congress, released Nelson Mandela from prison, and took the first steps toward negotiating a peaceful transfer of power from the White minority to the Black majority.
In 1979, Hans Morgenthau, the great scholar of international relations, confessed to a friend: "I am extremely pessimistic. In my opinion the world is moving ineluctably toward a third world war-a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it" (Boyle, 1985, p. 73) . Three months later, George Kistiakowsky (a chemist and presidential science advisor who helped to develop the atomic bomb) told a Harvard audience that "I personally think that the likelihood for an initial use of nuclear warheads is really quite great between now and the end of this century" (Boyle, 1985, p. 73 ). Yet the millennium has come, and we are still here, without the use (so far) of nuclear warheads or a third world war.
Concessions, Compromise, and the Resolution of Conflict

The Necessity of Concessions
If wars are frequent and human beings are often violent toward each other, it is also true that humans can (and often do) compro mise to avoid conflict escalation and war. The essence of every conflict is a clash of two or more incompatible desires, claims, or principles: One party (person, group, or nation-state) wants, claims, or supports something that is also wanted, claimed, or opposed by another party. For conflicts to be resolved (at least in the absence of some creative win-win option), therefore, one side must make a concession, giving up some previously announced claim (also called a conciliatory initiative; see Pruitt, 1998, p. 490) . Concessions may be mutual. They may emerge from discus sion and negotiation, the threat of force, or the suggestion of a party. They may be motivated by the highest ethical principles or Not every conflict or crisis escalates to war. Even when there may seem to be no way out, a way is sometimes found. For example, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy estimated the chances of nuclear war as "somewhere between one out of three and even" (Sorenson, 1965, p. 705 ). Yet Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev and Kennedy worked their way out of a nuclear box, each making concessions while resisting the siren calls from some advisors to "stand firm" or even begin military action (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997) .
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Concessions, Compromise, and the Resolution of Conflict
The Necessity of Concessions
If wars are frequent and human beings are often violent toward each other, it is also true that humans can (and often do) compro mise to avoid conflict escalation and war. The essence of every conflict is a clash of two or more incompatible desires, claims, or principles: One party (person, group, or nation-state) wants, claims, or supports something that is also wanted, claimed, or opposed by another party. For conflicts to be resolved (at least in the absence of some creative win-win option), therefore, one side must make a concession, giving up some previously announced claim (also called a conciliatory initiative; see Pruitt, 1998, p. 490) . Concessions may be mutual. They may emerge from discus sion and negotiation, the threat of force, or the suggestion of a third party. They may be motivated by the highest ethical principles or third driven by tear of consequences. They may be disguised or "sweet driven by fear of consequences. They may be disguised or "sweet ened" by processes of reframing, redefinition, or other creative ened" by processes of reframing, redefinition, or other creative negotiation and mediation techniques (Fisher Ury, 1991; Pruitt, negotiation and mediation techniques (Fisher & & Ury, 1991; Pruitt, 1983; Rubin, 1981) . In every case, however, concessions are the 1983; Rubin. 1981) . In every case, however, concessions are the fundamental building block of conflict resolution. fundamental building block of conflict resolution.
To be successful, of course, concessions must ultimately be To be successful, of course, concessions must ultimately be reciprocated. The course of negotiations, in international diplo reciprocated. The course of negotiations, in international diplo macy as well as in the laboratory, usually involves the orchestra macy as well as in the laboratory, usually involves the orchestra tion tion of of a a complex combination of elements (demands, threats, complex combination of elements (demands, threats, promises, concessions, and even third-party interventions) into into promises, concessions, and even third-party interventions) overall strategies (see Patchen, 1987 ; also Carnevale Pruitt, overall strategies (see Patchen, 1987; also Carnevale & & Pruitt, 1992; Lebow, 1996, chapters 6-8; Rubin, ). 1992 Lebow, 1996, chapters 6-8; . Still, one side usually has to take the first step. Thus, on Octo Still, one side usually has to take the first step. Thus, on Octo ber 24, 1962, Khrushchev answered Kennedy's proclamation of ber 24, 1962 . Khrushchev answered Kennedy's proclamation of a a limited blockade with defiance: "The Soviet government cannot limited blockade with defiance: "The Soviet government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the instructions of American naval forces blockading that island" the instructions of American naval forces blockading that island" (Fursenko & Naftali. 1997, p. 256) . On the next day, however, he (Fursenko & Naftali. 1997, p. 256) . On the next day, however, he told the meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party told the meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party that he would order four ships that were transporting missiles to that he would order four ships that were transporting missiles to Cuba to turn around and would propose the removal of missiles in Cuba to turn around and would propose the removal of missiles in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba-this set in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba-this set in motion the exchange of messages between Khrushchev and motion the exchange of messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy that ultimately shaped the resolution of the crisis. Kennedy that ultimately shaped the resolution of the crisis.
It is important to realize that concessions may not always be (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 61-62; see also Jervis, 1976) , an insatia (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 61-62; see also Jervis, 1976) , an insatia ble and powerful opponent may respond with further demands ble and powerful opponent may respond with further demands instead of reciprocal concession (Lebow, 1996, p. 78) . Thus, instead of a a reciprocal concession (Lebow, 1996, p. 78) . Thus, making concession may not ultimately prevent war. Over 2,000 making a a concession may not ultimately prevent a a war. Over 2,000 years ago, the Roman lawyer and political leader Cicero (trans. years ago, the Roman lawyer and political leader Cicero (trans. 1953, p. 527) asked, "What can be done against force without 1953, p. 527) asked, "What can be done against force without force?" ' Schmookler's (1984) analysis of the "ways of power" force? '" Schmookler's (1984) analysis of the "ways of power" suggests that the reply should be, "Not much." suggests that the reply should be, "Not much."
In the minds of several generations of American leaders, the In the minds of several generations of American leaders, the apparent failure of the 1938 Munich and 1945 Yalta agreements apparent failure of the 1938 Munich and 1945 Yalta agreements thoroughly discredited concessions and appeasement. As Clark thoroughly discredited concessions and appeasement. As Clark Clifford (1946 /1968 ) advised President Harry Truman in 1946 Clifford (1946 /1968 advised President Harry Truman in a a 1946 memorandum memorandum that that was was to guide U.S. policy toward the Soviet to guide U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the late 1940s: "The language of military power is the Union in the late 1940s: "The language of military power is the only language the disciples of power . . . . Compromise only language the disciples of power understand understand.... Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidence of and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidence of weakness and they're encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new weakness and they're encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new and greater demands" (p. 477). and greater demands" (p. 477).
Concessions may be misinterpreted as signs of weakness, capit Concessions may be misinterpreted as signs of weakness, capit ulation, or collapse (Schelling, 1963, pp. 71, 111) . For example, ulation, or collapse (Schelling, 1963, pp. 71,111 (Rusk, 1990, p. 237) , which seemed to frame Khrush Bundy, Bundy, "We are are eyeball to to eyeball and blinked!" (Rusk, 1990, p. 237) , which seemed to frame Khrush chev's action in terms of the adolescent game of "chicken." At a a chev's action in terms of the adolescent game of "chicken." At more symbolic level, making concessions may suggest passivity more symbolic level, making concessions may suggest passivity and low prestige (see Morley Stephenson, 1977, pp. 40-41, on and low prestige (see Morley & & Stephenson, 1977, pp. 40-41 , on image loss). Because power relations and gender are often taken as image loss). Because power relations and gender are often taken as metaphors for each other (Scott, 1986 ; see also , many metaphors for each other (Scott, 1986 ; see also , many male political leaders might even (albeit not always consciously) male political leaders might even (albeit not always consciously) view concessions as threats to their sexual orientation and gender view concessions as threats to their sexual orientation and gender identity. identity.
Finally, concessions may be impossible to sell to constituents Finally, concessions may be impossible to sell to constituents (Lebow, 1996, pp. 12,95, 104) . In fact, Khrushchev's concessions (Lebow, 1996, pp. 12, 95, 104) . In fact, Khrushchev's concessions during the Cuban Missile Crisis were one reason his opponents during the Cuban Missile Crisis were one reason his opponents removed him from office two years later. As one of his most severe removed him from office two years later. As one of his most severe critics claimed at that time, "We had to accept every demand and critics claimed at that time, "We had to accept every demand and condition dictated by the U . S . . . . This incident damaged the in condition dictated by the U.S.... This incident damaged the in of government, party, armed ternational ternational prestige prestige of our our government, our our party, our our armed forces, while at the same time raising the authority of the United forces, while at the same time raising the authority of the United States" (Fursenko Naftali, 1997, p. 354) . States" (Fursenko & & Naftali, 1997, p. 354 ). If we understood the psychological factors that led political If we understood the psychological factors that led political leaders to make concessions instead of escalations, we might be able to able to encourage encourage more more felicitous outcomes outcomes like the examples like the examples leaders to make concessions instead of escalations, we might be felicitous mentioned at the beginning. To that end, this article describes two mentioned at the beginning. To that end, this article describes two studies, one archival and one laboratory, designed to identify studies, one archival and one laboratory, designed to identify motivational factors associated with the choice of concession and motivational factors associated with the choice of concession and compromise, rather than escalation and aggression, in conflict compromise, rather than escalation and aggression, in a a conflict situation. We also wanted to explore the relation between people's situation. We also wanted to explore the relation between people's images of concession and their actual offering of concessions. images of concession and their actual offering of concessions. (Gilbert, Fiske, Lindzey, 1998) and not at all in either of the most recent Fiske, & & Lindzey, 1998) and not at all in either of the most recent handbooks of personality research, the topic of concession making handbooks of personality research, the topic of concession making involves wide variety of cognate concepts and literature, includ involves a a wide variety of cognate concepts and literature, includ ing, at the least, the following: bargaining, negotiation, decision ing, at the least, the following: bargaining, negotiation, decision making, conflict resolution, power and dominance, aggression, making, conflict resolution, power and dominance, aggression, altruism, trust, deference, conformity and compliance, submission, altruism, trust, deference, conformity and compliance, submission, and appeasement. and appeasement. However, the However, the core core generalizations about the generalizations about the antecedents of making versus withholding concessions are drawn antecedents of making versus withholding concessions are drawn from the enormous literature on social conflict and negotiation. from the enormous literature on social conflict and negotiation. Much of the review that follows is based on Carnevale and Pruitt Much of the review that follows is based on Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) , Druckman (1994 Druckman ( , 1997 , , Pruitt and Rubin (1992) , Druckman (1994 Druckman ( , 1997 , , Pruitt and Rubin (1986) , and Thompson (1990) . (See Morley Stephenson, 1977 , (1986 , and Thompson (1990) . (See Morley & & Stephenson, 1977, for review of earlier work; see Kriesberg, 1998 , and Kriesberg for a a review of earlier work; see Kriesberg, 1998, and Kriesberg & & Thorson, 1991 , for reviews that draw extensively on the history of Thorson, 1991 , for reviews that draw extensively on the history of international relations.) international relations.)
Psychological Research on Concessions
Structural Structural and and Situational Situational Factors Factors
The likelihood of one or both parties offering concessions in a a The likelihood of one or both parties offering concessions in conflict or negotiation situation is affected by many structural and conflict or negotiation situation is affected by many structural and situational factors, such as the following: the number of parties situational factors, such as the following: the number of parties (bilateral vs. multilateral) ; the institutional framework (e.g., judi (bilateral vs. multilateral); the institutional framework (e.g., judi [ Cicero's letter, written in 44 B.C.E., was addressed to his ally Cassius ' Cicero's letter, written in 44 B.C.E., was addressed to his ally Cassius during the hectic months months after the assassination of Julius Caesar. during the hectic after the assassination of Julius Caesar.
cial vs. religious atonement); the the site and physical setting negotiations (e.g., the "shape of the table" that was so controversial cial vs. religious atonement); site and physical setting of of negotiations (e.g., the "shape of the table" that was so controversial in the Vietnam peace negotiations in the early 1970s); the agenda, in the Vietnam peace negotiations in the early 1970s); the agenda, decision rules, and normative structure; the public visibility of the decision rules, and normative structure; the public visibility of the negotiating parties (e.g., through presence of the media or other negotiating parties (e.g., through presence of the media or other audience); the existence of deadlines and time pressures; the audience); the existence of deadlines and time pressures; the number and of issues under discussion; and the the initial number and nature nature of issues under discussion; and initial positions of the parties and consequent distance between these positions of the parties and consequent distance between these positions. More abstractly, the incentive structure (or "payoff positions. More abstractly, the incentive structure (or "payoff matrix") represents the possible gains and losses to each party, as matrix") represents the possible gains and losses to each party, as consequence of their combined decisions and responses. a a consequence of their combined decisions and responses.
Relational Relational Factors Factors
Most negotiating parties have previous history of negotiating Most negotiating parties have a a previous history of negotiating with each other and with other parties; frequently this history is with each other and with other parties; frequently this history is said to furnish lessons or heuristics that are are applied, rightly or said to furnish lessons or heuristics that applied, rightly or wrongly (Khong, wrongly (Khong, 1992; Neustadt 1992; Neustadt & & May, 1986) , to to frame the May, 1986) , frame the current negotiation. Depending on the interests of each side, it may current negotiation. Depending on the interests of each side, it may be easier or to discover (or construct) common overarching be easier or harder harder to discover (or construct) common overarching interests that can help to bridge areas of disagreement. At any point interests that can help to bridge areas of disagreement. At any point during the actual negotiations, the cumulative history of the current during the actual negotiations, the cumulative history of the current process itself-the complex and dynamic sequence of process itself-the complex and dynamic sequence of requests, requests, demands, threats, concessions, compromises, reciprocity (or its demands, threats, concessions, compromises, reciprocity (or its lack)-exerts powerful effects on the next steps (Morley Ste lack)-exerts powerful effects on the next steps (Morley & & Ste phenson, 1977, pp. 85-101) . Thus, we can speak of (when phenson, 1977, pp. 85-101) . Thus, we can speak of ripeness ripeness (when the "time is ripe" for intervention, for making a concession, for the "time is ripe" for intervention, for making a concession, for compromise, etc.; see Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991) and compromise, etc.; see Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991) and turning turning in the negotiation process (Druckman, 1997, p. 99; 2000) . points points in the negotiation process (Druckman, 1997, p. 99; 2000) .
Individual Individual Factors Factors
Individual negotiating parties and individual persons differ in Individual negotiating parties and individual persons differ in their willingness to make concessions. For example, the gender their willingness to make concessions. For example, the gender and cultural backgrounds of negotiators affect how they negotiate. and cultural backgrounds of negotiators affect how they negotiate. Bureaucratic politics-that is, the perceived domestic social, eco Bureaucratic politics-that is, the perceived domestic social, eco nomic, and political constituencies and support structures (and nomic, and political constituencies and support structures (and opposition structures) of each party-often exert substantial ef opposition structures) of each party-often exert substantial ef fects on ostensibly external negotiations. And the kind of advance fects on ostensibly external negotiations. And the kind of advance preparation negotiators undertake (thinking about strategy vs. is preparation negotiators undertake (thinking about strategy vs. is sues) affects their subsequent level of compromise behavior. At sues) affects their subsequent level of compromise behavior. At tributions, especially about the situation and traits of the negotiat tributions, especially about the situation and traits of the negotiat ing counterpart, are also critically important (Morris, Larrick, & ing counterpart, are also critically important (Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999) . Su, 1999) .
The meta-analysis of compromising behavior in Orientation. Orientation. The meta-analysis of compromising behavior in negotiation by Druckman (1994) suggested that individual differ negotiation by Druckman (1994) (1994, p. 192 ) noted, orientation is often measured by Grzelak (1994, p. 192 ) noted, orientation is often measured by outcome-a procedure that confuses independent and dependent outcome-a procedure that confuses independent and dependent variables and invites circularity. It is useful, therefore, to review variables and invites circularity. Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1979; Wallace, Suedfeld, Thachuk, 1979; Wallace, Suedfeld, & & Thachuk, 1993) demonstrated the connection between integrative complex 1993) demonstrated the connection between integrative complex ity and peaceful resolution of international crises. In contrast, ity and peaceful resolution of international crises. In contrast, right-wing authoritarianism is associated with escalation in labo right-wing authoritarianism is associated with escalation in labo ratory simulations (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 130-136) . ratory simulations (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 130-136 (particularly implicit motives; see see McClelland, McClelland, Koestner, Weinberger, 1989) . Implicit motives are measured Koestner, & & Weinberger, 1989) . Implicit motives are measured through content analysis of verbal material, using the empirically through content analysis of verbal material, using the empirically derived content-analysis scoring systems developed by McClel derived content-analysis scoring systems developed by McClel land and his colleagues (see Winter, 1998; also Smith, 1992 , for land and his colleagues (see Winter, 1998; also Smith, 1992 , for a a discussion of methodological and psychometric issues). For exam discussion of methodological and psychometric issues). For exam ple, power motivation (a concern for impact, prestige, and repu ple, power motivation (a concern for impact, prestige, and repu tation) is often associated with verbal and physical aggression (see tation) is often associated with verbal and physical aggression (see Winter, 1996, chapter 5) and an exploitative, aggressive negotia Winter, 1996, chapter 5) and an exploitative, aggressive negotia tion style (see Schnackers Kleinbeck, 1975; Terhune, 1968 , tion style (see Schnackers & & Kleinbeck, 1975 Terhune, 1968 Terhune, , 1970 . In contrast, affiliation motivation (a concern for close, 1970). In contrast, affiliation motivation (a concern for close, friendly relations among people and groups) is often linked to friendly relations among people and groups) is often linked to cooperative behavior, at least under "safe" conditions. Table 1 cooperative behavior, at least under "safe" conditions. Table I provides a brief description of the content-analysis scoring and provides a brief description of the content-analysis scoring and associated actions and outcomes for these two motives. associated actions and outcomes for these two motives.
Motivation (Winter, 1980 (Winter, , 1992 . Finally, in content-analysis studies of archi (Winter, 1980 (Winter, , 1992 . Finally, in content-analysis studies of archi val materials such as cultural documents and government mes val materials such as cultural documents and government mes sages, high levels of power motivation are associated with subse sages, high levels of power motivation are associated with subse quent war entry, whereas high levels of affiliation motivation are quent war entry, whereas high levels of affiliation motivation are often associated with avoidance of war or at least ending war often associated with avoidance of war or at least ending war (Winter, 1993 (Winter, , 1997 . (Winter, 1993 (Winter, , 1997 .
A A laboratory study of conflict escalation by showed that when and Doty (1994) showed that when one one side expressed higher laboratory study of conflict escalation by Peterson, Winter, side expressed higher power and lower affiliation motive imagery (vs. lower power and power and lower affiliation motive imagery (vs. lower power and higher affiliation motive imagery), the other side responded in kind higher affiliation motive imagery), the other side responded in kind (higher power and lower affiliation), as well as with higher levels (higher power and lower affiliation), as well as with higher levels of 3 of aggression. aggression.
3
Overall, then, there is strong ground for believing that the Overall, then, there is strong ground for believing that the affiliation motive is at the core of the cooperative orientation and affiliation motive is at the core of the cooperative orientation and that, in negotiation situations, it should therefore be associated that, in negotiation situations, it should therefore be associated with making concessions and accepting the concessions of others. with making concessions and accepting the concessions of others. In contrast, the power motive should be an important component of In contrast, the power motive should be an important component of the competitive orientation and should be associated with resis the competitive orientation and should be associated with resis tance to making concessions, or rejecting concessions made by the tance to making concessions, or rejecting concessions made by the other side. The research reported in this article was designed to other side. The research reported in this article was designed to explore these general hypotheses in two very different ways: (a) explore these general hypotheses in two very different ways: (a) through content analysis of archival data drawn from actual dip through content analysis of archival data drawn from actual dip lomatic negotiations and (b) through a laboratory simulation of lomatic negotiations and (b) through a laboratory simulation of negotiation negotiation during during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We
We agree with with Cuban the Missile Crisis. agree Grezelak's (1994 , Grezelak's (1994 260) call for 260) call for integration integration of of laboratory laboratory re re search on conflict and cooperation orientations with field or archi search on conflict and cooperation orientations with field or archi val studies of "real-life phenomena," to demonstrate that our val studies of "real-life phenomena," to demonstrate that our theoretical concepts and measures are truly relevant to social theoretical concepts and measures are truly relevant to social reality (see also the integrative review by Patchen, 1987) . reality (see also the earlier earlier integrative review by Patchen, 1987) . Thus, we proposed to relate concession making to the affiliation Thus, we proposed to relate concession making to the affiliation and power motives-measured in both laboratory tests and archi and power motives-measured in both laboratory tests and archi val government documents by the same content-analysis systems. val government documents by the same content-analysis systems.
The concept of motive imagery, as used in this article, deserves The concept of motive imagery, as used in this article, deserves a a brief conceptual discussion. We used scoring systems that were brief conceptual discussion. We used scoring systems that were developed in the tradition of personality research, where individual developed in the tradition of personality research, where individual Thematic Apperception Test protocols were content analyzed to measure measure the motives of individual persons (see Winter, 1998) .
Thematic Apperception Test protocols were content analyzed to the motives of individual persons (see Winter, 1998 ). When applied to speeches, diplomatic communications, and other When applied to speeches, diplomatic communications, and other documents usually produced by collectivities, we cannot be sure documents usually produced by collectivities, we cannot be sure that that we are measuring the motives of the persons whose name is we are measuring the motives of the persons whose name is concession, and how can it be measured in both it be measured in both archival and laboratory research? On the one hand, the diplomatic archival and laboratory research? On the one hand, the diplomatic history literature contains many examples few precise opera history literature contains many examples but but few precise opera tional definitions or procedures for quantification. On the other tional definitions or procedures for quantification. On the other hand, laboratory researchers often measure concessions by seem hand, laboratory researchers often measure concessions by seem ingly superficial variables such as the giving or exchanging of ingly superficial variables such as the giving or exchanging of small sums of money or "points." Although these measures are small sums of money or "points." Although these measures are precise, they do not necessarily have anything to do with conces precise, they do not necessarily have anything to do with conces sions in the real world of international relations (or, for that matter, sions in the real world of international relations (or, for that matter, even significant interpersonal relationships). For the present re even significant interpersonal relationships). For the present re search, therefore, we decided to construct new measure of search, therefore, we decided to construct a a new measure of concession making that could be used in both archival and labo concession making that could be used in both archival and labo ratory studies. ratory studies.
Measuring Measuring Concessions:
Concessions On the basis On the basis of of a a review of the political and psychological Thorson, 1991, pp. 264-265) , as well as intensive comparison of diplomatic docu [264] [265] , as well as intensive comparison of diplomatic docu ments from crisis that escalated to war and similar crisis that ments from a a crisis that escalated to war and a a similar crisis that was peacefully resolved, Langner (1997) developed system was peacefully resolved, Langner (1997) first first developed a a system for coding concessions on the basis of verbal content. The two for coding concessions on the basis of verbal content. The two crises were the outbreak of war between the United States and crises were the outbreak of war between the United States and Mexico and the peaceful settlement of the U.S. dispute with Great Mexico and the peaceful settlement of the U.S. dispute with Great Both the Britain Britain about the about the Oregon boundary. Oregon boundary. Both were related to were related to the American sense of Manifest Destiny and territorial expansion to American sense of Manifest Destiny and territorial expansion to the Pacific Coast, both were handled by the handled by the administration administration of of the Pacific Coast, both were President James K. Polk, and both occurred during 1845 and the President James K. Polk, and both occurred during 1845 and the first half of 1846 (see Winter, 1997) . first half of 1846 (see Winter, 1997) .
The concessions scoring system is organized in terms of four The concessions scoring system is organized in terms of four positive categories and four parallel negative categories. The pos positive categories and four parallel negative categories. The pos itive categories all involve proposing or accepting concessions in itive categories all involve proposing or accepting concessions in dispute: a a dispute:
1. Proposals Proposals for for procedural arrangements that that will facilitate I.
procedural arrangements will facilitate negotiation and peaceful resolution of crisis; negotiation and peaceful resolution of a a crisis; 2. Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party (cf. 2. Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party (cf. Rubin, 1981) ; Rubin, 1981) ; 3. Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation 3. Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation (can be subdivided into unilateral and reciprocal de-escalation ( Table 2 . In applying the system, the sentence is the unit of scoring. Table 2 . In applying the system, the sentence is the unit of scoring. The eight categories are logically independent of each other, which The eight categories are logically independent of each other, which The first study was designed for two purposes: (a) to establish The first study was designed for two purposes: (a) to establish the real-world validity of the concessions scoring system and (b) to the real-world validity of the concessions scoring system and (b) to explore the relationships between affiliation and power-motive explore the relationships between affiliation and power-motive imagery and concessions. To cross-validate the scoring system, imagery and concessions. To cross-validate the scoring system, diplomatic diplomatic documents and other written government-to-gov documents and other written government-to-gov ernment communications from two additional pairs of crises were ernment communications from two additional pairs of crises were mixed together and blindly scored for concessions and motive mixed together and blindly scored for concessions and motive imagery. Each pair consisted of peacefully resolved crisis and imagery. Each pair consisted of a a peacefully resolved crisis and a a similar crisis (involving approximately the same countries, during similar crisis (involving approximately the same countries, during the same same historical era) that escalated to to armed conflict. This armed conflict. the historical era) that escalated This method has been characterized by George (1979) as method has been characterized by George (1979) Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitate negotiation and peaceful resolution of crisis. Example: Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitate negotiation and peaceful resolution of a a crisis. Example: "We are prepared to set one single date if that would facilitate the task." "We are prepared to set one single date if that would facilitate the task." Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party. Example: "If desired, I I am willing to arrange for the Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party. Example: "If desired, am willing to arrange for the representatives of third party at the discussion." representatives of a a third party at the discussion." Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, not contingent on response of other side. Unilateral: Unilateral: Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, not contingent on response of other side.
Example: "I am willing to eliminate harmful military expenditures and focus on maintaining peaceful relations Example: "I am willing to eliminate harmful military expenditures and focus on maintaining peaceful relations between our countries." between our countries." Reciprocal: Reciprocal: Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, contingent on response of other side.
Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, contingent on response of other side. Example: "I assure you that if you adhere to the tenets of our agreement, eliminating the specified weapons, we Example: "I assure you that if you adhere to the tenets of our agreement, eliminating the specified weapons, we will not attack." will not attack." Accepting concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I will agree to your public Accepting a a concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I will agree to your public declaration that you are not supplying weapons and will agree not to invade." declaration that you are not supplying weapons and will agree not to invade."
Negative categories Negative categories Declining or rejecting procedural proposal (positive Category 1 above) made by the other side. Example: "Further Declining or rejecting a a procedural proposal (positive Category I above) made by the other side. Example: "Further communication between our diplomats is proving unproductive at this point, and therefore our representatives will communication between our diplomats is proving unproductive at this point, and therefore our representatives will be returning home." be returning home." Refusing suggestion or offer of mediation. Example: "This government is not willing to involve third party in the Refusing a a suggestion or offer of mediation. Example: 'This government is not willing to involve a a third party in the current dispute." current dispute."
Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, not contingent on response of other side. Unilateral: Unilateral: Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, not contingent on response of other side.
Example: "We are prepared to halt your military shipments and will do so by stopping and examining your ships." Example: "We are prepared to halt your military shipments and will do so by stopping and examining your ships." Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, contingent on response of other side. Reciprocal: Reciprocal: Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, contingent on response of other side.
Example: "If you break our agreement of nonviolence, we will retaliate." Example: "If you break our agreement of nonviolence, we will retaliate." Rejecting proposed concession (positive Category above) made by the other side. Example: "I cannot accept your Rejecting a a proposed concession (positive Category 3 3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I cannot accept your promise of not supplying weapons and therefore will not guarantee anything. The first hypothesis of the archival study is that the documents The first hypothesis of the archival study is that the documents from the two peacefully resolved crises will score higher in total from the two peacefully resolved crises will score higher in total and positive concessions and lower in negative concessions than and positive concessions and lower in negative concessions than documents from the two war crises. The second hypothesis is that documents from the two war crises. The second hypothesis is that across all documents, the number of positive concessions will be across all documents, the number of positive concessions will be positively correlated with affiliation motivation and negatively positively correlated with affiliation motivation and negatively correlated with power motivation and that for negative conces correlated with power motivation and that for negative conces sions, these correlations will be reversed. sions, these correlations will be reversed.
Method Method
The first step we took was to establish precise Selection Selection of ofdocuments. documents. The first step we took was to establish precise beginning and ending dates. On the basis of the discussion in Watt (1989) (April 6-22, 1961) and Cuban Missile Crisis (October 22-28, 1962) were (April 6-22, 1961) and Cuban Missile Crisis (October 22-28,1962) were based on the dates of the and last documents available for 4 based on the dates of the first first and last documents available for scoring. scoring.
4
For each crisis, all documents representing official government public For each crisis, all documents representing official govemment public statements or government-to-government communications communications were drawn statements or government-to-government were drawn from the collection of documents assembled by Winter (1997) from pub from the collection of documents assembled by Winter (1997) Butler. 1949 Butler. -1954 . For the two U.S. -Soviet 1949 -Soviet -1954 . For the two U.S.-Soviet crises involving Cuba, the written government-to-government communi crises involving Cuba. the written government-to-government communi cations (from U.S. Department of State, 1973) were supplemented by two cations (from U.S. Department of State, 1973) were supplemented by two public statements by President John F. Kennedy (one speech and one press public statements by President John F. Kennedy (one speech and one press conference transcript) and three official Soviet public statements, for total conference transcript) and three official Soviet public statements, for a a total of seven Bay of Pigs documents and 12 Cuban Missile Crisis documents. of seven Bay of Pigs documents and 12 Cuban Missile Crisis documents. Within each of the paired crises, the documents used were comparable: Within each of the paired crises. the documents used were comparable: verbatim government-to-government communications for Munich and Po verbatim government-to-government communications for Munich and Po land and government-to-government communications plus public state land and government-to-government communications plus public state ments for the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis. ments for the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis.
To the extent that we were able to match both the nature of the crises and To the extent that we were able to match both the nature of the crises and the type of documents scored within each pair, within-pair differences can the type of documents scored within each pair, within-pair differences can be attributed (whether as cause or effect) to the different outcomes-peace be attributed (whether as cause or effect) to the different outcomes-peace or war-of the two crises. or war-of the two crises. Documents Documents from all four crises from all four crises were mixed Scoring Scoring of of documents. documents. were mixed together in random order and scored for concessions by two scorers who together in random order and scored for concessions by two scorers who had been trained by Carrie Langner. To avoid bias, scoring of concessions had been trained by Carrie Langner. To avoid bias, scoring of concessions was done by two scorers who were unaware of the purpose and hypotheses was done by two scorers who were unaware of the purpose and hypotheses of the research and who had little knowledge of the four specific crises. The of the research and who had little knowledge of the four specific crises. The scorers were trained in the use of the scoring system by Langner. scorers were trained in the use of the scoring system by Langner.
On portion of these documentary materials that had also been scored On a a portion of these documentary materials that had also been scored by Langner, these two scorers attained category agreement figures (see by Langner. these two scorers attained category agreement figures (see Smith, 1992, p. 529) with Langner of .75 and .63. Both scorers scored all Smith, 1992 . p. 529) with Langner of .75 and .63. Both scorers scored all documents, resolving all disagreements after discussion. Because the doc documents, resolving all disagreements after discussion. Because the doc uments varied in length, the raw concessions scores for each document uments varied in length, the raw concessions scores for each document were divided by the number of words and multiplied by 1,000 to give a a were divided by the number of words and multiplied by 1,000 to give figure of concessions per 1,000 words. Finally, subtracting negative con figure of concessions per 1,000 words. Finally, subtracting negative con cessions from from positive concessions scores gave a a net concessions score. cessions positive concessions scores gave net concessions score.
These documents had previously been scored for affiliation and power These documents had previously been scored for affiliation and powermotive imagery according to the integrated running-text scoring system motive imagery according to the integrated running-text scoring system (Winter, 1991) as part of Winter's (1997) study, by trained scorer who (Winter, 1991) as a a part of Winter's (1997) study, by a a trained scorer who was blind to the hypotheses and the historical details of the crises and who was blind to the hypotheses and the historical details of the crises and who had previously demonstrated high reliability (category agreement a .85) had previously demonstrated high reliability (category agreement"" .85) on materials precoded by expert scorers. Scores for each motive were also on materials precoded by expert scorers. Scores for each motive were also expressed in terms of images per 1,000 words. To avoid the theoretical expressed in terms of images per 1,000 words. To avoid the theoretical issue of whether impersonal documents or their collective authors can have issue of whether impersonal documents or their collective authors can have motives or motivation (as individual persons do; see Winter, 1993) , as well motives or motivation (as individual persons do; see Winter. 1993) , as well as the conceptual status of the motive imagery measures, we used the as the conceptual status of the motive imagery measures, we used the theoretically more neutral term motive imagery to refer to these scores. theoretically more neutral term motive imagery to refer to these scores. Overall, then, the concessions scores differentiate the war and Overall, then, the concessions scores differentiate the war and peace crises of both historical eras in the predicted ways. In one peace crises of both historical eras in the predicted ways. In one sense, these initial results may seem obvious because, almost by sense, these initial results may seem obvious because, almost by definition, peaceful crisis resolution involves one or both sides definition, peaceful crisis resolution involves one or both sides making positive concessions, and war results from negative con making positive concessions, and war results from negative con cessions. The real point of this first study, however, was to cessions. The real point of this first study, however, was to demonstrate the validity of the concessions scoring system on real demonstrate the validity of the concessions scoring system on real archival material drawn from major international crises. archival material drawn from major international crises.
Results Results
Validity
The trend for documents from the two U.S.-Soviet crises of The trend for documents from the two U.S.-Soviet crises of [1961] [1962] a paucity of official government-to-government documents, as well as public statements, it was government-to-government documents, as well as public statements, it was necessary to include documents through April 22, by which time Kennedy necessary to include documents through April 22, by which time Kennedy was already commissioning an investigation of the failed operation (Korn was already commissioning an investigation of the failed operation (Korn bluh, 1998, pp. 303-320) . Because study was designed not to predict bluh, 1998, pp. 303-320) . Because this this study was designed not to predict the outbreak of war but rather to validate the concessions scoring system, the outbreak of war but rather to validate the concessions scoring system.
should not be problem. One would certainly predict that communi this this should not be a a problem. One would certainly predict that communi cations during war itself, like communications before the war, contain cations during a a war itself, like communications before the war, contain few positive concessions. few positive concessions. Overall, these results from the archival study demonstrate that Overall, these results from the archival study demonstrate that the concessions measures show the predicted relationships both to the concessions measures show the predicted relationships both to actual crisis outcomes and to motive imagery. However, because actual crisis outcomes and to motive imagery. However, because motive imagery and concessions were scored from the same doc motive imagery and concessions were scored from the same doc uments, these latter results might arguably reflect shared method uments, these latter results might arguably reflect shared method variance (i.e., overlap of the two content analysis scoring systems) variance (i.e., overlap of the two content analysis scoring systems) rather than actual relationships between two separate, independent rather than actual relationships between two separate, independent sets of concepts. sets of concepts.
Concessions
Several comments can be made in response to such a a concern.
Several comments can be made in response to such concern.
First, the manifest contents of the two scoring systems are, in fact, First, the manifest contents of the two scoring systems are, in fact, very distinct (d . Tables 1  1 and 2 ). The actual scoring of documents very distinct (cf . Tables and 2) . The actual scoring of documents for concessions and motives was carried out by two scorers, at two for concessions and motives was carried out by two scorers, at two different times; each scorer was unaware of the scorings made by different times; each scorer was unaware of the scorings made by the other. Moreover, the magnitudes of the correlations and re the other. Moreover, the magnitudes of the correlations and re gression coefficients reported in Table 3 , although highly signifi gression coefficients reported in Table 3 Table  Table 4 His Majesty's Government are so greatly disturbed by the signs of His Majesty's Government are so greatly disturbed by the signs of deterioration in the atmosphere [Affiliation image-concern at dis deterioration in the atmosphere [Affiliation image-concern at dis ruption of relationship] surrounding the negotiations at Prague and ruption of a a relationship] surrounding the negotiations at Prague and by the seriousness of the consequences of any other than peaceful by the seriousness of the consequences of any other than a a peaceful solution that they feel compelled to APPROACH THE GERMAN GOVERN solution that they feel compelled to APPROACH THE GERMAN GOVERN MENT AND TO ASK FOR THEIR COOPERATION in averting any such MENT AND TO ASK FOR THEIR COOPERATION in averting any such calamitous termination to the discussion. (Woodward & Butler, calamitous termination to the discussion. (Woodward & Butler, 1949 -1954 [Positive concession: process; 1949 -1954 Rejecting a a previously offered proposal; would also be Power if previous sentence had not offered proposal; would also be Power if previous sentence had not already been scored] having the character of an ultimatum, to recall its already been scored] having the character of an ultimatum, to recall its forces which are lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to forces which are lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to accept the old unrest and the old injustice. The threat that, failing this, accept the old unrest and the old injustice, The threat that, failing this, they will fight Germany in the war [Power image], corresponds to the they will fight Germany in the war [Power image], corresponds to the intention proclaimed for years past by numerous British politicians. intention proclaimed for years past by numerous British politicians. The German Government and the German people had assured the The German Government and the German people had assured the English people countless times how much they desire an understand English people countless times how much they desire an understand ing, , it is not the fault of the German people. (Woodward and Butler, 1949-1954 , fault of the German people. (Woodward and Butler, 1949-1954, Vol. 7, pp. 539-541) Vol. 7, pp. 539-541) On the basis of all these considerations, therefore, we believe
On the basis of all these considerations, therefore, we believe that the concessions and motive imagery scoring systems are that the concessions and motive imagery scoring systems are conceptually distinct and that their empirical relationship is not conceptually distinct and that their empirical relationship is not simply an artifact of shared method variance (i.e., content overlap simply an artifact of shared method variance (Le" content overlap of the two systems).
of the two systems).
Sequential Sequential Pattern Pattern of of Concessions Concessions in in Crises Crises
The Munich and Poland crises showed interesting differences in
The Munich and Poland crises showed interesting differences in The basic procedure used in Study was adapted from Procedure. Procedure. The basic procedure used in Study 2 2 was adapted from a a study by Peterson et al. (1994, Study 1) . Participants were instructed as study by Peterson et al. (1994, Study I Mr. President, you and I I should not now pull on the ends of the rope Mr. President, you and should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied knot of war, because the harder you and in which you have tied a a knot of war, because the harder you and II pull, the tighter this knot will become. And time may come when pull, the tighter this knot will become. And a a time may come when knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable this this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would mean need not explain to you, because you yourself understand mean I I need not explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess. perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.
Calling on each side to show "statesmanlike wisdom," Khrushchev pro Calling on each side to show "statesmanlike wisdom," Khrushchev pro posed the compromise that became the basis for the ultimate settlement of posed the compromise that became the basis for the ultimate settlement of the crisis (The complete original letter is reproduced in U.S. Department of the crisis (The complete original letter is reproduced in U.S. Department of State, 1973 ; the basic version used in the present study is from Peterson et State, 1973 ; the basic version used in the present study is from Peterson et al., , pp. 742-744.) a!., 1994 After reading the letter, participants were asked to perform the following After reading the letter, participants were asked to perform the following task: task:
Imagine that you are really in the middle of major historical crisis. Imagine that you are really in the middle of a a major historical crisis. Please imagine that you are an advisor to President Kennedy. The Please imagine that you are an advisor to President Kennedy. The letter you have read has just come in and the President has asked you letter you have read has just come in and the President has asked you to draft reply to send to Khrushchev. to draft a a reply to send to Khrushchev.
Participants were given a a sheet of lined paper, headed "The White House," Participants were given sheet of lined paper, headed "The White House," with the date of October 27, 1962, and an inside address to "Chairman with the date of October 27, 1962, and an inside address to "Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R." entered at the top Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R." entered at the top and "John F. Kennedy, President of the United States" at the bottom. and "John F. Kennedy, Presiderit of the United States" at the bottom. Participants were allowed about 20 min to write their responses. Participants were allowed about 20 min to write their responses.
After finishing their draft response letters, participants were asked to After finishing their draft response letters, participants were asked to indicate their preferred policies for dealing with the crisis by indicating indicate their preferred policies for dealing with the crisis by indicating their agreement (on 9-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 their agreement (on a a 9-point Likert scale, ranging from I (strongly ( Khrushchev on the basis of his proposals. Call off the blockade, and offer to negotiate with Khrushchev on 6. 6. Call off the blockade, and offer to negotiate with Khrushchev on the basis of his proposals. the basis of his proposals. 7. 7. Accept his proposals as they stand, and call off the blockade.
Accept his proposals as they stand, and call off the blockade.
Two Two summary scores were calculated from the overall pattern of partici pants' pants' policy choices. Because the policy choices. Because the seven items, arranged in the above summary scores were calculated from the overall pattern of partici seven items, arranged in the above order, form order, form an approximate Thurstone an approximate Thurstone scale, scale, 5 5 it was possible to calculate it was possible to calculate an "overall peacefulness of policy choices" score by multiplying ratings of an "overall peacefulness of policy choices" score by multiplying ratings of the seven responses by -3 , -2 , -1 , 0 , 1,2, and 3, respectively, and then the seven responses by -3, -2, -1,0, 1,2, and 3, respectively, and then calculating the mean (Thurstone Chave, 1929, p. 64) . However, from calculating the mean (Thurstone & & Chave, 1929, p. 64) . However, from both theoretical and practical points of view, another important summary both theoretical and practical points of view, another important summary measure is participants' average endorsement of Policy Choices 5, 6, and 7, measure is participants' average endorsement of Policy Choices 5, 6, and 7, all of which involve negotiation and, thus, de-escalation. This is described all of which involve negotiation and, thus, de-escalation. This is described as the "average endorsement of negotiation choices." as the "average endorsement of negotiation choices."
Using semantic differential methods (Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum, Using semantic differential methods , participants then rated the following concepts on 13 seven-point 1957), participants then rated the following five five concepts on 13 seven-point According According to to semantic differential theory, these these adjective semantic differential theory, scales yield adjective scales yield scores for the three major dimensions of connotative meaning: evaluation scores for the three major dimensions of connotative meaning: evaluation (good-bad), potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). Finally, (good-bad), potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). Finally, participants were asked their gender, ethnicity, year in college, and (on participants were asked their gender, ethnicity, year in college, and (on 9-point scales) "How interested in international relations are you?" (an 9-point scales) "How interested in international relations are you?" (an choring points of 1 disinterested] to interested]) choring points of I [extremely [extremely disinterested The abbreviated Khrushchev letter had Khrushchev Khrushchev letter letter versions. versions. The abbreviated Khrushchev letter had been previously been coded for power and affiliation motivation by an been previously been coded for power and affiliation motivation by an expert scorer, according to Winter's (1991) manual (see Peterson et al., expert scorer, according to Winter's (1991) manual (see . For the present study, four different versions of this abbreviated 1994). For the Present study, four different versions of this abbreviated letter were created, involving different combinations of motivation and letter were created, involving different combinations of motivation and concession. Appendix presents these four variations of the Khrushchev concession. Appendix B B presents these four variations of the Khrushchev letter. In two versions of the letter (the power motivation conditions), all letter. In two versions of the letter (the power motivation conditions), all 9 9 sentences with affiliation imagery were removed and all 14 sentences with sentences with affiliation imagery were removed and all 14 sentences with power power motive imagery motive were were retained. In the In other other versions imagery the two versions (the (the retained. two affiliation motivation conditions), the 14 power images were removed and affiliation motivation conditions), the 14 power images were removed and the affiliation images retained. These two motivation conditions were the 9 9 affiliation images retained. These two motivation conditions were crossed by two concession conditions. In the "explicit concession" condi crossed by two concession conditions. In the "explicit concession" condi tions, Khrushchev's compromise offer was explicitly quoted, as follows: tions, Khrushchev's compromise offer was explicitly quoted, as follows:
We, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba I I propose:
propose: We, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not not carrying any armaments. armaments. carrying any You will declare that the United are You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. other forces which might intend to invade Cuba.
(In terms of the concessions scoring system introduced in this article, this (In terms of the concessions scoring system introduced in this article, this passage would be scored for positive concession Category 3, "De-escala passage would be scored for positive concession Category 3, " De-escala That is, the correlations of each item with adjacent items are positive 5 5 That is, the correlations of each item with adjacent items are positive and higher than the correlations with all other items. and higher than the correlations with all other items. Table   Table 5 tion: Reciprocal"). In contrast, the no-concession conditions omitted tion: Reciprocal"). In contrast, the no-concession conditions omitted this this passage, which left the excerpt of Khrushchev's letter containing only passage, which left the excerpt of Khrushchev's letter containing only threats, warnings, and nonspecific call for "statesmanlike wisdom." Some threats, warnings, and a a nonspecific call for "statesmanlike wisdom." Some of these versions might seem incongruous: for example, letter with many of these versions might seem incongruous: for example, a a letter with many power images that offered concession, concession, or a a letter full of affiliation of affiliation power images that offered a a or letter full imagery without an explicit concession. However, we believe that each of imagery without an explicit concession. However, we believe that each of the four versions was plausible as single, free-standing communication. The four different versions of the abbreviated Khrushchev letter were The four different versions of the abbreviated Khrushchev letter were randomly mixed together by stacking the versions in random order, thus randomly mixed together by stacking the versions in random order, thus creating 2 2 factorial design for analyzing the effects factorial design for analyzing the effects of of the motive the motive creating a a 2 2 x x imagery (affiliation vs. power) and concession (explicit concession vs. no imagery (affiliation vs. power) and concession (explicit concession vs. no in Khrushchev's letter on several variables: (a) the concessions concession) concession) in Khrushchev's letter on several variables: (a) the concessions and motive imagery in the responses participants drafted for the president, and motive imagery in the responses participants drafted for the president, (b) participants' policy choices, and (c) participants' implicit images of (b) participants' policy choices, and (c) participants' implicit images of various aspects of the negotiation process. All four conditions (i.e., various aspects of the negotiation process. .85) on materials precoded by expert scorers. Concessions were scored by the first author, who was blind to the scorers. Concessions were scored by the first author, who was blind to the experimental condition and all other information about the participants and experimental condition and all other information about the participants and their responses. Motive scores were expressed in the usual way, as images their responses. Motive scores were expressed in the usual way, as images per 1,000 words. The brevity of the response letters (range = 27-229 27-229 per 1,000 words. The brevity of the response letters (range = words, words, Mdn Mdn = = 129 words), however, meant that most concession catego 129 words), however, meant that most concession catego ries were scored only once if at all. (Ninety eight percent of all positive ries were scored only once if at all. (Ninety eight percent of all positive concessions scores scores and 93% of all 93% negative concessions negative concessions scores were concessions and of all scores were either or 1.) Adjusting raw scores for length, as was done with the much either 0 0 or I.) Adjusting raw scores for length, as was done with the much longer diplomatic documents used in Study 1, would actually introduce longer diplomatic documents used in Study I, would actually introduce substantial distortion. For purposes of the present study, the important substantial distortion. For purposes of the present study, the important point was whether, in response to different versions of the Khrushchev point was whether, in response to different versions of the Khrushchev letter, the letters contained any concession; therefore, concession scores letter, the letters contained any concession; therefore, concession scores were were not adjusted for length not adjusted for length of of response. response. The Pearson correlations with 7 7 The Pearson correlations with these these measures, measures, therefore, approach the point-biserial correlations that therefore, approach the point-biserial correlations that would be obtained by using the collapsed presence/absence scores. would be obtained by using the collapsed presence/absence scores.
Plan Plan of of analysis analysis and and hypotheses. hypotheses. Study 2 2 was designed to explore, in Study was designed to explore, in an experimental setting, the antecedents and associated consequences of an experimental setting, the antecedents and associated consequences of making concessions (i.e., of the concessions scores in participants' letters). making concessions (i.e., of the concessions scores in participants' letters). We were interested in three basic questions: (a) Would the relationships, We were interested in three basic questions: (a) Would the relationships, we expected that the affil positive concession in their response. Further, Further, we expected that the affil iation motivation version of the Khrushchev letter would be more likely to iation motivation version of the Khrushchev letter would .be more likely to elicit concessions in participants' responses, (c) Finally, we were interested elicit concessions in participants' responses. (c) Finally, we were interested in exploring the relationship among both concessions and motivation in in exploring the relationship among both concessions and motivation in participants' response letters and their explicit policy choices, as well as the participants' response letters and their explicit policy choices, as well as the connotative meanings reflected in their images of the major actors in the connotative meanings reflected in their images of the major actors in the crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev), the concept of ideal leader, their own crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev), the concept of ideal leader, their own responses, and the concept of concessions. responses, and the concept of concessions. negative concessions and endorsements of different policy options.
Results Results
Validation
In general, people scoring high in positive concessions and net
In general, people scoring high in positive concessions and net concessions tended to endorse specific policy choices that in concessions tended to endorse specific policy choices that in volved negotiation rather than escalation and score higher on both volved negotiation rather than escalation and score higher on both the "overall peaceable" and the negotiation summary scores. Peo the "overall peaceable" and the negotiation summary scores. Peo to simple presence-absence measures produced essentially the same results. For ease of presentation, however, we present the results using continuous scores. of presentation, however, we present the results using continuous scores. preliminary analysis A A preliminary analysis showed no pattern of significant relationships among the depen showed no pattern of significant relationships among the depen dent variables and the demographic variables (ethnicity, year in dent variables and the demographic variables (ethnicity, year in college), interest in international relations, or previous knowledge college), interest in international relations, or previous knowledge of the Cuban Missile 9 (The effects of of gender gender will be will be of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Crisis. 9 (The effects discussed below.) Table 6 , therefore, presents descriptive statistics discussed below.) Table 6 , therefore, presents descriptive statistics on the major variables of Study for each of the four separate on the major variables of Study 2 2 for each of the four separate experimental conditions defined by the four versions of the experimental conditions defined by the four versions of the Khrushchev letter as well as for the entire combined sample. Khrushchev letter as well as for the entire combined sample.
The effects of the experimental conditions were tested with tested with The effects of the experimental conditions were three-way analyses of variance for the dependent variables based three-way analyses of variance for the dependent variables based on participants' responses to Khrushchev and their policy choices, on participants' responses to Khrushchev and their policy choices, with the Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (variables of with the Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (variables of explicit concession and affiliation versus power motivation) and explicit concession and affiliation versus power motivation) and participants' gender as as main effects. Whether .001, and lower power, higher affiliation, F(l, 109) = F( F(l, I, 109) 109) = = 10.54, p = = .002, than did those receiving the power .002, than did those receiving the power 10.54, P version. (That power was greater than affiliation in all conditions version. (That power was greater than affiliation in all conditions was probably due to the "pulling power" or motive-arousal effects was probably due to the "pulling power" or motive-arousal effects of the experimental situation.) There was a near-significant trend of the experimental situation.) There was a near-significant trend for the Khrushchev letter version that offered an explicit conces for the Khrushchev letter version that offered an explicit conces sion to elicit a higher average endorsement of negotiation choices, sion to elicit a higher average endorsement of negotiation choices, consistent with other evidence showing that, under some circumstances at least, women tend to show lower under some circumstances at least, women tend to show lower levels of certain kinds of aggressive behaviors than do men (Geen, levels of certain kinds of aggressive behaviors than do men (Geen, 1998, pp. 330-332) . There were no gender differences in either 1998, pp. 330-332) . There were no gender differences in either motive imagery score. There was one significant two-way inter motive imagery score. There was one significant two-way inter action involving gender: action involving gender: women women responded with higher power responded with higher power motive imagery (though motive imagery (though not more aggressive responses) when not more aggressive responses) when Khrushchev's letter included an explicit concession, whereas men Khrushchev's letter included an explicit concession, whereas men showed the opposite pattern, F (l, 109) = .006. Perhaps showed the opposite pattern, F(l, 109) = = 8.00, 8.00, p p = .006. Perhaps in in a a (until recently, at least, a simulated international conflict least, a simulated international conflict (until recently, at stereotypically male situation), these women felt pressure to em stereotypically male situation), these women felt pressure to em bellish their response to a "dove" (Khrushchev's concession) with bellish their response to a "dove" (Khrushchev's concession) with their own imagery of the "hawk" (power motive). Finally, there their own imagery of the "hawk" (power motive). Finally, there was one near-significant three-way interaction: Inspection of was one near-significant three-way interaction: Inspection of means showed that in the two mildly incongruous conditions means showed that in the two mildly incongruous conditions (Khrushchev's letter if either high affiliation with no concessions (Khrushchev's letter if either high affiliation with no concessions or high power with concessions), women had higher average or high power with concessions), women had higher average endorsement of negotiation choices than did men, F(l, endorsement of negotiation choices than did men, Figure Figure 1 Figure 1 presents the results of different results of Study 2, Figure I presents the results of a a descriptive path analysis showing all significant relationships be descriptive path analysis showing all significant relationships be tween experimental condition and response variables to the aver tween experimental condition and response variables to the aver age endorsement of negotiation choices (i.e., the average endorse age endorsement of negotiation choices (Le., the average endorse ment of the three policy choices involving negotiation). The causal ment of the three policy choices involving negotiation). The causal ordering reflected in this figure assumes that the two experimental ordering reflected in this figure assumes that the two experimental conditions involving the Khrushchev letter precede the character conditions involving the Khrushchev letter precede the character istics of the participants' response letter and that, within the letter, istics of the participants' response letter and that, within the letter, motives precede concessions. These assumptions are certainly motives precede concessions. These assumptions are certainly debatable; however, the intention of the figure is to give coherent debatable; however, the intention of the figure is to give a a coherent overall description of our results rather than to test single specific overall description of our results rather than to test a a single specific causal model. Obviously this is a post hoc model that needs further causal model. Obviously this is a post hoc model that needs further testing in future replications. As suggested by the figure, the testing in future replications. As suggested by the figure, the explicit concession-related content of a received communication explicit concession-related content of a received communication directly affects the tendency to offer explicit concessions in re directly affects the tendency to offer explicit concessions in re sponse. The motive imagery of the received communication di sponse. The motive imagery of the received communication di rectly affects the motive imagery of the response; the response rectly affects the motive imagery of the response; the response motive imagery, in turn, affects explicit concessions offered in the motive imagery, in turn, affects explicit concessions offered in the response. This suggests, as a potential general principle, that the response. This suggests, as a potential general principle, that the motive imagery of communications-involving affective tone motive imagery of communications-involving affective tone more than explicit content-has effects on concessions that are more than explicit content-has effects on concessions that are indirect or mediated by the arousal of motive imagery of indirect Table 7 , participants who made positive LETTER. As shown in Table 7 , partICIpants who made pOSItive concessions tended to view their own response as higher in eval concessions tended to view their own response as higher in eval uation and lower in potency, whereas participants who made uation and lower in potency, whereas participants who made negative concessions showed the reverse pattern. Interestingly negative concessions showed the reverse pattern. Interestingly enough, people's tendency to make concessions not related to enough, people's tendency to make concessions was was not related to the perceived potency of concession making itself. Gender the perceived potency of concession making itself. Gender was was related to participants' images of compromise and their own re related to participants' images of compromise and their own re Women tended to view COMPROMISE as both better and sponses. sponses whether participants offered a a positive concession in response. The motive imagery in the Khrushchev letter also had in response. The motive imagery in the Khrushchev letter also had reciprocal effect on motive imagery levels in participants' re a a reciprocal effect on motive imagery levels in participants' re sponses: The affiliation version elicited higher affiliation and sponses: The affiliation version elicited higher affiliation and lower power than did the power version. In other words, received lower power than did the power version. In other words, received concessions primed concessions offered in response, and received concessions primed concessions offered in response, and received motive imagery primed response motive imagery. In this experi motive imagery primed response motive imagery. In this experi ment, there were no significant cross-primes; that is, concessions ment, there were no significant cross-primes; that is, concessions did not directly prime motive imagery, or vice versa. did not directly prime motive imagery, or vice versa.
The motive imagery results of Study replicate the archival The motive imagery results of Study 2 2 replicate the archival findings of the archival Study I reported previously. Making findings of the archival Study 1 reported previously. Making positive concessions is positively related to affiliation motivation positive concessions is positively related to affiliation motivation and negatively related to power motivation, whereas making neg and negatively related to power motivation, whereas making neg ative concessions shows the reverse pattern. The pattern of con ative concessions shows the reverse pattern. The pattern of con Table  Table 7 cession making in participants' response letters was related to their cession making in participants' response letters was related to their endorsement of policy choices involving negotiation. endorsement of policy choices involving negotiation. One might wonder whether students' knowledge of how the One might wonder whether students' knowledge of how the Cuban Missile Crisis actually ended (presuming that they actually Cuban Missile Crisis actually ended (presuming that they actually knew) could somehow bias their responses and thus affect the knew) could somehow bias their responses and thus affect the results. This is an unavoidable problem for experiments that use results. This is an unavoidable problem for experiments that use actual crises rather than laboratory simulations (except on rare actual crises rather than laboratory simulations (except on rare occasions such as as the the fall fall of 1990, when the Gulf Crisis was was occasions such of 1990, when the Gulf Crisis ongoing and the ultimate result was unknown), but it is difficult to ongoing and the ultimate result was unknown), but it is difficult to determine the effects of such knowledge. On the one hand, one determine the effects of such knowledge. On the one hand, one could argue that knowing the crisis ended peacefully would make could argue that knowing the crisis ended peacefully would make participants more reckless in their responses; on the other hand, the participants more reckless in their responses; on the other hand, the fact that the Cold War had long since ended might make them fact that the Cold War had long since ended might make them more conciliatory. In any case, however, any general effect for more conciliatory. In any case, however, any general effect for participants to imitate Kennedy's decisions and actions in 1962 participants to imitate Kennedy's decisions and actions in 1962 should tend to wipe out, rather than create, the effects observed should tend to wipe out, rather than create, the effects observed here. Finally, as discussed above, we found that students' selfhere. Finally, as discussed above, we found that students' self reported knowledge of the crisis was unrelated to any of their reported knowledge of the crisis was unrelated to any of their responses. responses.
Discussion Discussion
Main Main Findings Findings
two studies extend our knowledge of how conflicts may be resolved through compromise, Taken together, the results Taken together, the results of of these these two studies extend our knowledge of how conflicts may be resolved through compromise, because they illuminate some important motivational and situa because they illuminate some important motivational and situa tional dynamics of making (or rejecting) concessions. Both in tional dynamics of making (or rejecting) concessions. Both in archival and laboratory settings, the affiliation motive is associated archival and laboratory settings, the affiliation motive is associated with positive concessions; power motivation, in contrast, predicts with positive concessions; power motivation, in contrast, predicts negative concessions or rejecting concessions offered by the other negative concessions or rejecting concessions offered by the other side. In the laboratory study, the concession-related content of side. In the laboratory study, the concession-related content of a a message elicited or primed concessions in response, and the mo message elicited or primed concessions in response, and the mo tivational tone of the message primed motive imagery in response. tivational tone of the message primed motive imagery in response. Response motive imagery, in turn, was related to offering conces Response motive imagery, in turn, was related to offering conces sions and to endorsing policy choices involving negotiation. These sions and to endorsing policy choices involving negotiation. These are important effects, because in both archival and experimental are important effects, because in both archival and experimental studies, concessions (and their associated motive imagery) have studies, concessions (and their associated motive imagery) have been shown to be related to policy and ultimate outcomes of war been shown to be related to policy and ultimate outcomes of war versus peace. Thus the present studies increase the precision of versus peace. Thus the present studies increase the precision of terms cooperative and competitive negotiating orienta terms such such as as cooperative and competitive negotiating orienta tions, which have been used to describe individual state and trait tions, which have been used to describe individual state and trait differences in negotiation style. differences in negotiation style.
These findings are consistent with previous studies of interna These Druckman, Druckman, 1986; Druckman Harris, 1990; Druckman, 1991; 1991; Druckman, 1986; Druckman & & Harris, 1990; Stoll MeAndrew, 1986 ) and demonstrating matching (or "tit Stoll & & McAndrew, 1986 ) and demonstrating matching (or "tit for-tat") effects during the course of negotiation (Carnevale & & for-tat") effects during the course of negotiation (Carnevale Pruitt, 1992) . Pruitt, 1992) .
System System for for Scoring
Scoring Concessions Concessions the studies provided both archival and Taken together, Taken together, the two two studies provided both archival and experimental validation for the system for scoring and measuring experimental validation for the system for scoring and measuring concessions. Because the positive and negative concessions mea concessions. Because the positive and negative concessions mea sures showed the predicted relationship to crisis outcome (archival sures showed the predicted relationship to crisis outcome (archival study) and policy choices (experimental study), they can be seen as study) and policy choices (experimental study), they can be seen as reflecting critical Our results suggest some aspects of a a general model of the compromise process. The tendencies to make positive concessions, and not to make negative concessions, seem to be critical deter and not to make negative concessions, seem to be critical deter minants of of whether conflict conflict will be peacefully peacefully resolved or minants whether a a will be resolved or escalate to war. The present research suggests that offering con escalate to war. The present research suggests that offering con cessions, in turn, is function of three factors: (a) people's dispo cessions, in turn, is a a function of three factors: (a) people's dispo sitional motive levels their balance between power and affil sitional motive levels (i.e., (i.e., their balance between power and affil iation motivation), (b) the balance of power and affiliation iation motivation), (b) the balance of power and affiliation motivation in messages they receive during the negotiation process motivation in messages they receive during the negotiation process (which appear to act as motive-arousal experiences; see Winter, (which appear to act as motive-arousal experiences; see Winter, 1998) , and (c) whether explicit concessions are offered to them in 1998), and (c) whether explicit concessions are offered to them in messages they receive during negotiation. messages they receive during negotiation.
Of course motives are only one of the psychological elements Of course motives are only one of the psychological elements that contribute to productive negotiations that can turn crises from that contribute to productive negotiations that can turn crises from escalation escalation to to peaceful peaceful resolution. Other variables, Other variables, such such as as the resolution. the tendency to be hostile and punitive toward out-groups (reflected in tendency to be hostile and punitive toward out-groups (reflected in authoritarianism authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), cognitive and social dominance orientation), cognitive complexity, and the many individual and structural characteristics complexity, and the many individual and structural characteristics reviewed at the beginning of this article also play important roles reviewed at the beginning of this article also play important roles in negotiation outcomes. in negotiation outcomes.
A A Concluding Concluding Cautionary Cautionary Note Note From From History History
Concessions are often essential to successful negotiation and the Concessions are often essential to successful negotiation and the maintenance of peace; however, concessions and compromise may maintenance of peace; however, concessions and compromise may not always be strategically effective or even morally "good." Thus, not always be strategically effective or even morally "good." Thus, most historians regard the British concessions and compromises most historians regard the British concessions and compromises embodied in the 1938 Munich agreements with Hitler-described embodied in the 1938 Munich agreements with Hitler-described by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as bringing "peace by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as bringing "peace with honour . . . peace for our time" (1939, p. 200 
